About Post-Communist Authoritarianism

1. In accordance with many classical definitions proposed by political scientists authoritarianisms mean political systems of limited pluralism which can either exercise the rule of law or reject it. Democracy is another modern political system which bases on rule of law as well as on political competition. Its crucial principle is political equality of the citizens, which can be realized through various forms of participation. Finally, totalitarianism will be defined as a political system that abolishes political and societal pluralism as well as the autonomy of societal subsystems: economy, culture and politics. It also decisively rejects the constitutional state.
2. All post-communist systems went through the period of a post-totalitarian temporary authoritarianism: the regime had changed and had allowed for a limited political pluralism before the free and democratic founding elections took place.
3. After the founding elections during the early nineties temporary authoritarianisms developed either into institutionalised authoritarianisms or into democracies. Countries of Central and North-Eastern Europe like Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia very fast established democratic systems and market economies while in Eastern Europe (i.e. in Russia, in the Ukraine and in Moldova) and in South-Eastern Europe the authoritarian tendencies, connected with the economy still, as previously, dominated by state, prevailed. Finally, in Central Asia (i.e. in Uzbekistan and in Turkmenistan) since the early nineties as well as in Belarus within the last years there have been even some signs of a “re-totalitarization”. The question, which factors are responsible for this variety of new political systems in the post-communist space, remains equally important for political scientists and for practical politics.
4. Most distinctive characteristics of the post-communist authoritarianisms are obviously linked to the communist system in which “state, economy and society … were indeed almost indistinguishable. There was no such thing as society. Or economy, or indeed a state; there was only the party pervading everything else”. Instead of being destroyed after the fall of communism, the communist system has been only modified. The democratic system transformation has failed and a new authoritarian political system with subsequent features (dimensions) has emerged:
1. Huge extension of power. This system prevails in society and ties up the autonomy of other societal sub-systems. Especially the emergence of economical and judicial autonomy has been thus prevented.
2. The constitutional state represents merely a façade behind which mighty actors use informal channels for decision making.
3. The political system is dominated by oligarchy – sometimes called “party of power” (partija vlasti) – consisting of actors active in the state, economy, legal system, secrete services, army and media on the level of central government as well as in the regions.
4. The oligarchy resorts to democratic procedures such as free elections and referenda and to democratic rhetoric in order to legitimate the authoritarian political system, and that is why it is appropriate to call it “quasi-democratic authoritarianism”. The democratic procedures are impudently manipulated and the official democratic rhetoric remains empty talk. Sometimes attempts are made to explain the anti-democratic features of the system with new theories like “controlled democracy” (Putin) or – if a re-totalitarisation is taking place – even with a new state ideology (Lukashenka).
5. The party system is extremely underdeveloped. Most political parties are created by the oligarchy and hardly ever get any continuous support from the society.
6. The political leadership and the mighty actors of quasi-democratic authoritarianism are informally connected with the centre and with powerful actors of the Russian authoritarianism: Kremlin and so called oligarchs.
5. One of the preconditions for such authoritarian system to emerge are passive and badly organized societies, which are partly to be seen as a legacy of the communist totalitarianism. During the decades of the totalitarian rule at least two generations of socialist subjects have been socialized. They expect the state to solve most of social problems and in return they are willing to accept its policies. These subjects (often called in the literature “soviet people”) did not express any wish for political participation in the past and do not do it today, even if they see their problems unsolved by the political system.
6. It is nowadays obvious that only post-communist countries with modern tradition of a constitutional state have built democratic systems. Therefore it must be stated that this tradition also represents inherited precondition for a successful transformation after the communism. It apparently facilitates new independence of judicial system. But even in the societies which had a functioning constitutional state in the pre-communist era, the completely new one must be created after the communist period in order to make a democracy possible.
7. There is a consensus among most scholars on the key role of the political elite in creating the new political system. In other words: the behaviour of politicians matters. But the question, which patterns of behaviour are supposed to be unavoidable for the democratization to be successful, has not drawn special attention.
8. Only if the political elite (defined narrowly as the ruling group) obeys law under any circumstances, the tradition of disregard for law can be condemned and democracy can be established. And in more detail: in order to give the new law system the space necessary for its independence, the political leadership and the opposition must practise the ethos of self-constraining. During the political crises they even have to accept the possible lost of power to be able to act in accordance with law. Thus, the law-abiding behaviour of the ruling class during a serious power struggle represents the litmus of democratic development.
9. The creation of a functional constitutional state in countries, which lack such tradition, cannot be achieved fast and has to last some decades. Thus, the expectation that any political leadership may “build a modern constitutional state” in the countries which have never known it, must be considered naïve. What is possible, however, is to deliberately create precondition for an evolutionary development of functioning polity limited by law.